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FAMILY LAW 
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER 
The year that passed, unlike its predecessor, brought change. The family 
court, after prior unanimity to the contrary, was held to have jurisdiction 
over what had been interfamilial felony assaults. Paternity cases ran the 
gamut from one which read the paternity action statute as barring any pro­
ceedings to a married woman through another which found the respondent 
to be a father despite uncontradicted medical evidence of his sterility. Con­
donation, in divorce proceedings, was further downgraded as a defense by a 
decision that strongly suggested that intercourse between the parties was 
inadequate proof. The most celebrated cases, however, were ones in which 
judges decided that Mexican divorces were invalid even when the parties 
appeared in Mexico, one personally and the other by attorney. 
Marriage.-New York is a state of easy marriage and difficult divorce. 
Barring the existence of one of the few grounds which make a purported 
marriage void, 1 anyone participating in a marriage ceremony celebrated by 
an appropriate official 2 is "married" until that status is altered by court 
decree. Nonetheless, since the immigration laws treat spouses of American 
citizens more liberally than other aliens, some sanctions exist in federal law 
against the use of the marital status to achieve an immigration end. As a 
result, in Lutwak v. United States,3 the United States Supreme Court affirmed 
convictions against the defendants who had, without explanation, claimed 
themselves "married" when their marriage served no other purpose than 
their immigration. The Court found it unnecessary, in that case, to face the 
question of what would happen if such marriages were valid under the rel­
evant law, since they held the validity of the marriage to be inconsequential 
in a fraud prosecution. The dissenters thought that the prosecution could 
only be upheld if the marriages were in fact invalid. 
Faced this year with marriages celebrated under New York law, the 
Second Circuit refused to uphold federal convictions against defendants in 
limited-purpose immigration marriages. 4 Although distinctions other than 
that the law of New York validates limited-purpose marriages (at least until 
annulled) were drawn, readers may find themselves agreeing with the dis­
senting late Judge Clark, who was "unable to perceive why this case is not 
precisely governed by Lutwak . . . .  [and who could not] discover what dis-
George J. Alexander is Associate Professor of Law at the Syracuse University College 
of Law and a Member of the New York and Illinois Bars. He is on leave, 1964 ·1965, as 
a Ford Fellow at the Yale Law School. 
I. The principal provisions are contained in N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law §§ 5, 6 (incest 
and bigamy). 
2. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § ll. 
3. 344 U.S. 604 (1952) . 
4. United States v. DIOgO, 320 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1963). 
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tinction my brothers are actually advancing .. . . "5 Lest one become con­
cerned that the case has made it possible to use New York for wholesale 
evasion of small quotas under the immigration laws, it should be added that 
the immigration laws themselves seem quite adequate to handle such a prob­
lem. Indeed, it seems likely that the acquitted defendants in this case are 
subject to deportation. 6 
Familial Disputes.-In People v. De jesus,7 the first appellate test of the 
family court's jurisdiction over what would be felony assaults under the 
family offense provisions of the Family Court Act, the Appellate Division, 
Fourth Department, found such jurisdiction to be exclusively in the family 
court. Rejecting the cases which had previously limited such jurisdiction to 
misdemeanor assaults, S the court held that the mandatory language of the 
Family Court Act,O when coupled with a similar mandatory provision in the 
New York Constitution,l O effectively granted exclusive jurisdiction to the 
family court. It disposed of the assertion of supreme court jurisdiction in 
these matters by saying, as is obvious, that the supreme court still retains 
jurisdiction to dismiss or transfer the matter to family court, and concluded 
with this interesting suggestion: "It may also well be that Supreme Court 
could retain the matter, but it would then be acting as a Family Court and 
would be required to follow the processes and procedures of the Family 
Court Act." l l  Moving to the constitutional power of the grand jury to 
indict, 1:.l the court held that it might be all right to interpret the section as 
requiring an indictment for infamous crimes but that, by operation of con­
stitutional amendment and legislation which set up the Family Court Act, 
anything which is a family offense is no longer a crime; at least it is not a 
crime until the family court makes it so by transferring the proceedings to 
the criminal court.13 
The asserted metamorphosis available to the supreme court to convert 
itself into a family court is difficult to follow. Presumably, the family court 
was established primarily because it would be a specialized court able to 
bring its own expertise and the expertise of its staff to bear on the designated 
5. Id. at 909-10. 
6. 66 Stat. 204 (1952),8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(I), (c) (1958). 
7. 21 App. Div. 2d 236, 250 N.Y.S.2d 317 (4th Dep't 1964). 
8. People v. Radison, 40 Misc. 2d 1063, 244 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1963); 
Ricapito v. People, 38 Misc. 2d 710, 238 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1963), aff'd, 
20 App. Div. 2d 567, 245 N.Y.S.2d 846 (2d Dep't 1963) (without reaching the instant 
question); People v. Klaff, 35 Misc. 2d 859, 35 Mise. 2d 862, 231 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Dist. Ct., 
Nassau Co. 1962). 
9. N.Y. FamIly Ct. Act § 813. 
10. N.Y. Const. art. 6, § 13(b) (McKinney Supp. 1964): "The family court shall 
have jurisdiction over the following classes of actions and proceedings which shall be 
originated in such family court . . crimes and offenses by or against minors or between 
spouses or between parent and child or between members of the same family or 
household." 
II. Supra note 7. at 239. 250 N.Y.S.2d at 322. 
12. N.Y. Con st. art. I. § 6. 
13. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 8l3(a)(i). 
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problems. These requirements seem also to have motivated removing these 
cases from other court calendars. Nonetheless, one is inclined to doubt that 
the supreme court will be motivated, with the press of other cases, to assert 
its jurisdiction in matters which it has now been told are properly to be 
handled by the designated family court. Also, however disturbing the thought 
of felony-assault made family-offense may be in theory, raising as it does the 
vision of a near murderer who cannot be prosecuted as a criminal because of 
the assertion of family court jurisdiction, the dangers are quite likely more 
fanciful than real. No reason comes to mind why a family court would pre­
vent the prosecution of a miscreant whose offense is grounded more in anti­
social behavior than in possibly reparable matrimonial difficulty. The only 
feature that remains somewhat disturbing to this writer is that families have 
now been equated with juvenile delinquents for special civil disciplinary 
treatment. This treatment will be described, as it was in De Jesus, as being 
beneficial to the respondent,1 4 but we have had a long history of difficulty 
with juvenile delinquency problems, which suggests that doing something 
for respondents may subject them to abuses from which they would be pro­
tected were the proceedings classed wholly criminal.15 
Marriage Dissolution.-The law of marital dissolution in this state has 
always had its Alice-in-"\Vonderland aura. This year, however, its otherworld­
liness is even more pronounced than usual. A number of unsettling and un­
settled questions have been raised. For example, what exactly is the status of 
a marriage when a spouse has been convicted and sentenced to life imprison­
ment? Our legislation provides neither for divorce nor annulment in such 
cases, but only for civil death. 1 6 Predictably, the living "dead" have come 
back to haunt the courts. The law provides explicitly that a later marriage 
by the other spouse is not void because of the existence of the life prisonerp 
and the Court of Appeals in a very careful opinion in Matter of Lindewall,18 
made it quite clear that the sentence of life imprisonment, ipso facto, ter­
minates the interest of the prisoner in his marital property. What the opinion 
of the Court of Appeals did not reach, however, is the puzzling question 
whether the other spouse must "elect" to terminate the marital relationship 
(as, for example, by remarriage) or whether it automatically dissolves as on 
actual death. To be sure, Lindewall strongly suggests automatic dissolution. 
On the other hand, it adverts to "authorities" which have indicated that an 
election is required. Testing this question this year is an action by a now­
released prisoner seeking a declaration that he is unmarried. Granting such a 
14. "[I]t cannot be said that this in any way harms anyone who is within the pro­
tective scope of [the grand jury provision] . . . .  " Supra note 7, at 241, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 324 . 
15. See, e.g., Matter of Ronny, 40 Misc. 2d 194, 242 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Family Ct., Queens 
Co. 1963) . 
16. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 6(2); N.Y. Penal Law § 511. 
17. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 6. 
18. 287 N.Y. 347, 39 N.E.2d 907 (1942) . 
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declaration, the court in Zizzo v. ZiZZO,19 found a basis for its ruling in the 
wife's declarations, first to a parole officer and later to the released prisoner, 
that she no longer desired to maintain the marital relationship. Apparently, 
the court adopted an election theory. The case, however, leaves the question 
about as unsettled as it was previously, since, obviously, the same result 
would have been achieved had the marriage terminated, ipso facto, on the 
life sentence. 
Some other people discovered themselves to have been unmarried when 
they had assumed their marriage valid. New York law still provides that on 
divorce the defendant shall be enjoined from remarrying during the life of 
his former spouse for a mandatory period of three years and thereafter until 
the court modifies the order.2o That these injunctions can be lightly treated 
is illustrated by Kiellman v. Kiellman,21 on which the author has previously 
commented.::!2 That they can be gravely treated is demonstrated by the follow­
ing case: In determining whether death benefits under workmen's compensa­
tion were to be paid to the plaintiff, the trial court, finding a "widow's" 
marriage to her deceased "husband" to have been barred by her oversight in 
failing to obtain a modification of her injunction, gallantly issued a modifica­
tion nunc pro tunc. The trial court was, of course, by Court of Appeals' 
authority, 23 in error, as the appellate division pointed out. The nunc pro 
tunc order could not be granted. 'Vithout such order, the marriage was void; 
the plaintiff was not a widow.24 
Other adjective provisions also caused confusion. 2 5  As always, however, 
the most significant dissolution cases related not to New York dissolution 
decrees but to those of sister states. It is apparent that the New York form of 
marital relief has been largely abandoned by default to the commercial 
exploitation of the "quickie" divorce states. Consequently, the significant 
question of state law relates to the continued validity of transitory divorces 
from one or another of the states. 2 6  
19. 41 Misc. 2d 928, 247 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1964). 
20. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 8. 
21. 28 Misc. 2d 717, 216 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1961). 
22. Alexander, Family Law, 1962 Survey of N.Y. Law, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 333, 334 
(1962). 
23. Merrick v. Merrick, 266 N.Y. 120, 194 N.E. 55 (1934). 
24. Farber v. United States Trucking Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 740, 247 N.Y.S.2d 82 
(3d Dep't 1964). 
25. For example, is substituted service of process adequate service in a matrimonial 
pwceedi!1g? Reading the statute, one '�0!l!d think so. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 3.08 provides for 
the sernce of summons generally. SubdiVISIOn 2 e.xpressly excludes matrimonial actions' 
5ubdh'ision 3, relating to substituted service, does not. Nonetheless, a court has held 
such service inappropriate to obtaining jurisdiction. Root v. Root, 43 Misc. 2d 337, 250 
N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct., Westch. Co. 1964). In light of the prior cases under what is 
nuw N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 232, the result seems correct. Weiss v. Weiss, 227 App. Div. 
757, 237 N.Y. Supp. 56 (4th Dep't 1929); Purvis v. Purvis, 167 App. Div. 717, 153 N.Y. 
5upp. 269 (4th Dep't 1915). Legislative clarification would be helpful. 
26. Sec Blake, The Road to Reno (1962); Alexander, Book Review, 14 Syracuse L. 
Rev. 512 (1963). 
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Alabama decrees had weathered the storm over Hartigan v. Hartigan,27 
and seemed still adequate to keep prior marriages dissolved when the 
Supreme Court of Alabama supplied a new bolt of lightning28 by reversing 
a dismissal of a complaint seeking to vacate a divorce decree in a proceeding 
instituted by a wife who had been represented in the divorce proceeding. 
Since the case is still in its preliminary stages, it is difficult to tell whether it 
will eventually squarely hold that an appearing party may attack a divorce 
decree for fraudulent assertions of residence.21l Because of the recency of the 
case its effects have not yet been felt in New York, but one can certainly 
expect another round of cases on the question whether Alabama divorcees 
ar� divorced beyond the ability of an appearing spouse to contest.so 
Dark also seemed the fate of Mexican divorces. Justice Coleman startled 
many practitioners by announcing, in Wood v. Wood,S! that Mexican di­
vorces granted to appearing spouses, in actions in which the other spouse 
appeared by counsel, are invalid. Actually, that statement was considerably 
broader than the one on which the court was required to rule.3 :! Plaintiff in 
the Mexican action had failed to sign the municipal register and had, thus. 
failed to make herself a "resident" of Mexico for purposes of a "contested" 
divorce. This infirmity apparently would have sufficed to invalidate the 
divorce.s3 
Those who clung briefly to the hope that Wood could be avoided by the 
simple act of signing the municipal register were quickly set adrift by 
Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel,34 in which the court disposed of the contention that 
such signature was determinative, saying "there is no merit to this contention 
as it will be observed that there are no requirements in Chihuahua that the 
party appearing in person be a bona fide resident or domiciliary in order to 
obtain a divorce." 3 5  Some of the broad language of Wood had already been 
reached. 
27. 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961). 
28. Winston v. Winston, 161 So. 2d 588 (Ala. 1964) . 
29. The complaint relied not only on such fraud but also on coercion and dUTes-�. 
The court clearly did not reach either the question whether fraud is sufficient by itself 
or whether the plaintiff was ultimately entitled to the relief requested even if her proof 
established several elements of her complaint. Nonetheless, the court specifically allowed 
an appearing party to challenge the decree granted and thus supplied one missing element 
in the interpretation of Hartigan: an action apparently may be maintained by a party 
to the proceeding as well as by the court, Aiello v. Aiello, 272 Ala. 505, HI!! So. 2d 18 
(1961), notwithstanding. 
30. See Alexander, Family Law, 1962 Survey of New York Law, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 
333 (1962). 
31. 41 Misc. 2d 95, 245 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1963). After the submission of 
this article. the appellate division reversed. Wood v. Wood, 22 App. Div. 2d 660. 25!! 
N.Y.S.2d 204 (1st Dep't 1964). 
32. An excellent discussion of the case is to be found in Foster, Family Law, 196!! 
Annual Survey of American Law 407, 409-12 (1964). 
33. See Berke, The Present Status of Mexican Divorces, !!6 N.Y. State Bar J. III 
(1964). 
34. 43 Misc. 2d 462, 251 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1964). After the submission 
of this article, the appellate division reversed. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 21 App. Div. 2d 6!15, 
253 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1st Dep't 1964). 
35. Id. at 473, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 576-77. 
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In many respects Mrs. Rosenstiel's position appeared stronger than Mrs. 
Wood's. Not only had she scrupulously signed the registry, but she had 
actually successfully litigated the validity of her divorce in Mexico with a 
person she claimed was her present husband who now sought a declaration 
of its invalidity in New York. Thus she had two defenses to his attempt to 
impugn their marriage: (1) she was free to marry since she had validly 
divorced her prior husband in Mexico; and (2) she was at least immune from 
suit concerning the validity of her divorce by her present mate since she had 
adjudicated her previous marital res with him and could now rely on res 
adjudicata. 
The court, however, found the absence of domicile of either party to the 
divorce determinative of the validity of the divorce; it was invalid. As for 
res adjudicata, the court was unprepared to accept its application for.a num­
ber of reasons. Irrespective of the others, one objection voiced would seem 
insurmountable: "there was no determination by any of the Mexican courts 
that the 1954 divorce was valid in New York under New York law as ob­
viously it could not determine."3 6 It boils down to this. Mexican courts, 
under these circumstances, cannot be given jurisdiction by the parties to 
hear divorce actions; they also cannot acquire jurisdiction to determine the 
validity of divorces previously granted. 
In its opinion, the court castigated the parties for violating Section 51 
of the Domestic Relations Law in the arrangement for the Mexican appear­
ances, although it is not clear what result its finding of brazenness in this 
respect had on its legal conclusions. In this portion of the opinion one can 
sense, perhaps better than in the others, the moral indignation of the trial 
justice. Why such wrath should be visited on Mrs. Rosenstiel, whose arrange­
ments were neither unique nor clandestine, is not clear. Why Mexican 
divorces should be treated with such contempt in light of sister state "quickie 
divorces" is equally puzzling. In the long standing climate of contrived 
arrangements, of which Mexican divorces are only a part, a more fruitful 
object for condemnation must be the chasm between written law and human 
experience. 
The broad statements of both Wood and Rosenstiel seem to fly in the 
face of other decisions, the latest of which is Heine v. Heine.37 It is too early 
to tell, however, whether they are to become obscurities or leading cases.3S 
Divorce decrees may be given harsh treatment by local courts in other 
respects as well. It has long been clear that, as an aspect of the divisible 
divorce doctrine, a New York court might provide for the support of a 
36. Id. at 466·67, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 570. 
37. 19 App. Div. 2d 695, 242 N.Y.S.2d 705 (2d Dep't 1963) (mem.). 
38. Cf. Kantrowitz v. Kantrowitz, 21 App. Div. 2d 654, 249 N.Y.S.2d 723 (1st Dep't 
1964) (\\1 allowed to contest Mexican divorce in which she appeared by attorney on 
ground of H's fraud respecting his support and marital plans). See also notes 31 and 34 
supra. 
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domiciled spouse notwithstanding an ex parte sister state divorce against 
her.39 The other part of the "division, " however, the status change of the 
divorce, was entitled to full faith and credit. It would appear that even this 
part may sometimes be attacked.4o H had gone to California and obtained an 
order of divorce, which, under California law, was to become final one year 
after the date of the decree. W sued for separation and alimony in New York. 
H's motion to dismiss W's action was denied, apparently not only on the 
ground of her right to alimony but also on the ground of her right to a 
separation. The divorce, ruled the court, was an interlocutory decree not 
entitled to full faith and credit. In that respect the court may well be follow­
ing the mainstream of opinion,41 but it is certainly moving a long way 
toward making diffusible divorce out of divisible divorce where states have 
interlocutory periods as long as California's. 
If one's spouse is going to a state with an interlocutory period somewhat 
shorter than California's, the standard adjective remedy to prevent his obtain­
ing a divorce has been the injunction. It has been clear that such an injunc­
tion would issue against any New York resident whose sole purpose in going 
abroad was to defeat the right of his New York spouse.42 It has been equally 
clear that such a decree would not issue when the spouse was legitimately 
domiciled in the state where he sought the divorce.43 What then if the spouse 
returned to a state such as Connecticut, which opens its divorce courts to 
persons domiciled at the time of marriage and returning with the intention 
of permanently remaining?44 A New York court this year, in Lowe v. Lowe,45 
held that although Connecticut could set its own rules for domicile, New 
York could protect the remaining spouse by injunction. Even this heady 
application of the injunctive powers of the New York courts may, however, 
prove somewhat illusory, since another court suggested that the injunction 
which issues in such cases does not prevent respondent's effective divorce. 
In Gidney v. Gidney,46 W, seeking separation, sought to block an application 
by H to serve a supplemental answer pleading a final divorce. W's claim was 
that the divorce had been obtained in violation of an injunction and was 
consequently void. Without reaching the merits of the controversy, the court 
granted H's request to supplement his answer and voiced grave doubts 
whether full faith and credit would allow it to do otherwise. Should the 
court be correct in its suggestion, and the injunction be enforceable solely by 
contempt proceedings, conceivably the Connecticut application and, indeed. 
even its general usefulness, will become considerably less significant. 
39. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 135 N.E.2d 553, 153 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956), 
aff'd, 354 U.S. 416 (1957) . 
40. Iverson v. Iverson, 42 Misc. 2d 338, 247 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1964) . 
41. See Note, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 878 (1941).  
42. Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E.2d 721 (1951) . 
43. Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 15 App. Div. 2d 880, 225 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1st Dep't 1962) . 
44. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46·15 (1958 rev.). 
45. 41 Misc. 2d 258, 244 N.Y.S.2d 847 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co. 1963) . 
46. 40 Misc. 2d 429, 242 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct., Erie Co. 1963) . 
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Finally, it should be noted that the decision of last year, which appeared 
to allow a divorce despite the fact that the parties continued to live together 
for fifteen months after the cause of action accrued, 47 seems to be substantially 
reinforced this year. In one case H had succeeded at trial in establishing the 
adultery of \V but, subsequent to the trial and prior to the decree, had re­
turned to his wife, told her that he knew she was innocent of wrongdoing, 
and asked her to have intercourse with him, which she did. Since the statute 
makes condonation an absolute defense to divorce4s and makes condonation 
turn on either affirmative proof or "voluntary cohabitation,"49 the trial court 
granted leave to file a supplemental answer alleging condonation. On the 
husband's appeal, the appellate division, in Prytherch v. Prytherch,50 barely 
affirmed the lower court on the ground that the act was "some evidence" of 
condonation. 51 Apparently, putting together the interesting cases of the last 
two years, the law now is that the defense of condonation, which may be 
established according to statute by voluntary cohabitation, is not necessarily 
established either by living together or by having intercourse. These novel 
decisions seem consistent with an effort to encourage reconciliation even 
though they appear not too faithfully to follow either the statutory law or 
prior case law. 
It may be that this line of cases has been somewhat encouraged by the 
provision added to Section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law in an apparent 
attempt to resolve a conflict between departments on the narrow question 
whether temporary alimony may be granted to a wife while she continues to 
live in her husband's home:5:l "[alimony may be granted by the court] not­
withstanding that the parties continue to reside in the same abode .. .. "53 
One court has held that implicit in this provision is a determination that the 
court may issue a separation decree while the parties are living together.54 
Support, .Marital Property.-Although alimony decrees were being 
appealed this year as previously, few principles were changed. The first 
department has again demonstrated its irritability at appeals from temporary 
alimony decrees. In Haber v. Haber,55 although some members of the court 
believed that the alimony awarded was "in excess of what the affidavits 
would justify," the court afed the trial court's disposition and instructed 
47. Miller y. Miller, 237 N.Y.S.2d 95 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1962). 
48. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 171(2). 
49. Ibid. 
50. :W App. Div. 2d 721, 247 N.Y.S.2d 579 (2d Dep't 1964). 
51. "while a single act of sexual intercourse may not establish condonation as a 
matter of law, we are of the opinion that such an act is some evidence of forgiveness, 
and that it should not be held as a matter of law that under no circumstances may a 
finding of condonation be based upon a single act." Id. at 722, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 581. 
5:!. Schultz v. Schultz, 1 App. Diy. 2d 930 (4th Dep't 1956) (it may); Lowenfish v. 
Lowenfish, 278 App. Diy. 716, 103 N.Y.S.2d 357 (2d Dep't 1951) (it may); Berman Y. 
Berman, 277 App. Diy. 560, 101 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1st Dep't 1950) (it may not). 
53. N.Y. Dom. ReI. Law § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1964). 
54. Okun Y. Okun, 41 Misc. 2d 244, 245 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co. 1963). 
55. 20 App. Div. 2d 858, 248 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1st Dep't 1964). 
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appellant to seek his remedy at trial. This was done despite the fact that the 
court recognized "that in many instances lawyers believe that the trial court 
is to some degree influenced in fixing permanent alimony by a prior award 
of temporary alimony .... " adding, "there ought to be no basis for such 
relief."56 
Mrs. Rosenstiel, who had been summarily evicted at the time of the last 
Survey, has since had her rights vindicated. The appellate division, in Rosen­
stiel v. Rosenstiel,51 stated that the law under which she had been evicted, 
now Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, Section 713(7), was not 
applicable to spouses since a spouse was not a "licensee" whose license "has 
been revoked." However ambiguous the statute might be in this respect,1I8 
the court held, "the occupation of the marital home by the wife as such is 
not, however, a possession existing by virtue of the 'permission' of her hus­
band or under a 'personal' and 'revocable privilege' extended by him. On 
the contrary, her possession of the premises exists because of special rights 
incidental to the marriage contract and relationship."59 Also, said the major­
ity, "where a matrimonial action is pending between a husband and wife, 
then, ordinarily, the matter of the occupancy and possession of the marital 
home should be determined by proper proceedings in such action." 6 0 Mr. 
Justice Steuer disagreed. It was his position that where the husband has 
apparently provided for his wife, he has no obligation to allow her to remain 
on his property and can, presumably, invoke the summary remedy to evict 
her. How "summary " a proceeding can be which must, as a prerequisite. 
determine that the husband has appropriately provided for the support of 
his wife is conjectural. In any event, all five justices agreed on one thing: 
Mrs. Rosenstiel would not be granted permission to return to her apartment 
since she had already moved out and there was a pending matrimonial 
action. 
It is well settled in this state that once alimony payments have been 
made they cannot be recovered from the wife even if their payment was 
premised on an order reversed on appeal.6 1 Thus, this year a husband won a 
Pyrrhic victory when he had a rent payment decree reduced. His overpay­
ment was not recoverable. 6 2  
56. Id. at 858, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 84. But cf. Weisner v. Weisner, 20 App. Div. 2d 52!!, 
244 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1st Dep't 1963) (reversing trial court pretrial order for the third time 
in same case). 
57. 20 App. Div. 2d 71, 245 N.Y.s.2d 395 (1st Dep't 1963); accord, Brennecke v. Smith, 
42 Misc. 2d 935,249 N.Y.S.2d 602 (Sup. Ct., Westch. Co. 1964). 
58. In 1960 the same department, in Tausik v. Tausik, 11 App. Div. 2d 144, 202 
N.Y.S.2d 82 (1st Dep't 1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 664, 173 N.E.2d 51, 212 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1961), had 
held a spouse to be a licensee within the meaning of this section. In Rosenstiel, Tausik 
is distinguished on the basis that in Tausik the parties had executed an agreement which 
gave the wife her tenant status and that this agreement had expired. 
59. Supra note 57, at 76, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 401. 
60. Id. at 77, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 402. 
61. Haas v. Haas, 271 App. Div. 107, 64 N.Y.S.2d 11 (2d Dep't 1946). 
62. Glasan v. Glassman, 41 Misc. 2d 132, 245 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 
196!!). 
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Does the same principle bar a husband's challenge of the support money 
given his wife for the support of children? If, irrespective of its use, the father 
cannot recover prior payments, one would think not. There were apparently 
no decisions squarely facing this problem in this jurisdiction before Rosen­
blatt v. Birnbaum.63 A husband brought an action to compel his ex-wife and 
her present husband to account for child support payments. By a majority 
of one, the appellate division held the wife a trustee for such payments and 
ordered an accounting. 
It is clear that the wife may expressly be made a trustee by the separation 
agreement. Certainly attorneys drafting agreements in which the wife's 
supporting the children is in doubt would be well advised to include such 
provisions. To make the absence of such a provision determinative, however, 
would seem to place form ahead of substance. "When money is provided for 
the support of children, it is presumably provided on the assumption that 
the husband will have his children supported from the fund. 
While there is authority in this state for avoiding Section 51 of the 
Domestic Relations Law, which prohibits contracting to dissolve a marriage, 
by drafting two agreements, one a separation agreement and the second an 
escrow agreement which would irrevocably vest only upon the wife's di­
vorce,6 4 the case hardly seems compatible with the purpose of section 51 and 
with the other cases under that section. It consequently comes as little sur­
prise to find such an escrow agreement held invalid this year. 6 5  
Section 51 of the Domestic Relations Law also expressly prohibits con­
tracting to avoid support obligations between spouses. By analogy to this 
section, or by reason of the court's supervisory authority in these matters, 6 6  
a parent is also prohibited from contractually erasing his obligation to sup­
port his child. May a father nonetheless do so as part of an undertaking 
between the spouses which envisages the adoption of the child by the wife's 
next husband? Apparently not. 6 7  
With increased longevity, the problem of support for the aged will 
predictably become a more important problem as time progresses. The 
Family Court Act specifically provides, in section 415, for the support of 
parents who are recipients of public assistance by children who can afford 
such support. This year one court felt called upon to lecture a child about 
the importance of these provisions. 6 8  Whether the public treasury is reim-
6!!. 20 App. Div. 2d 556, 245 N.Y.S.2d 72 (2d Dep't 1963). 
64. Tanburn v. Tanburn, 114 N.y.s.2d 670 (Sup. Ct .. , N.Y. Co. 1952). 
65. Taylor v. Renzi, 41 Misc. 2d 160, 245 N.Y.S.2d 456 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co. 196!!). 
66. Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 278 App. Div. 446, 106 N.Y.S.2d 237 (3d Dep't 1951), 
a/f'd, 305 N.Y. 671, 112 N.E.2d 766 (195!!). 
67. Smith v. Jones, 43 Misc. 2d 350, 250 N.Y.S.2d 955 (Family Ct., Kings Co. 1964). 
68. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 41 Misc. 2d 533, 534, 246 N.Y.S.2d 227, 229 (Family 
Ct., Bronx Co. 196!!). 
Formerly, indigent parents of advanced age were ordinarily cared for within 
the family group but today the feeling seems to prevail among many children 
that the government should assume the entire responsibility for the care of 
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burs ed, however, may depend on the substantiality of the familial relation­
ship.6 9 
Paternity .-Analyzing revised provisions in the Family Court Act last 
year's Survey indicated, "it would seem [under the new provisions] that no 
paternity action would ever lie if the mother was married."7o A conjecture 
has become holding.71 It still "seems peculiar."72 
Explicitly rejected in the above case is the application of Matter of 
Findlay,73 the principal case on the presumption of legitimacy and the 
standard of rebuttal required to overcome it. It is quite evident, however, 
that other courts continue to use Matter of Findlay as the basic determinant 
of the paternity of a married woman's child. One such case this year was 
J.10y J.1ee Soo v. Leong Yook Yick.74 It, too, concluded that the woman's 
child was her husband's but did so on the basis of the presumption in 
Findlay of the husband's paternity, given access and sexual potency. That 
even the presumption may be quite rebuttable can be seen in the opinion 
of the dissenting justice who would have held it rebutted on the basis of 
the wife's testimony denying intercourse with the husband, with whom she 
shared an apartment at the time of probable conception, and alleging 
intercourse only with the putative father. He would have done this despite 
the fact that the husband did not join his wife in this action in denying 
intercourse. Indeed, the majority seemed prepared to follow his lead but 
for the failure of the husband to testify. 
If it is difficult for a married woman to win a paternity proceeding, it 
may be equally difficult for a man to defend himself against an action by 
an unmarried woman. In Commissioner of Welfare v. Simon,75 the respon­
dent offered, by the testimony of a physician specializing in venereal disease, 
proof that he had a venereal disease making him then and at the time of 
conception infertile. An examination had been made of the respondent's 
their aged parents. Too often we hear children complain that they must deprive 
themselves of a certain luxury or lower their high standard of living, if called 
upon to even help, much less support their parents. One of their excuses is that 
they pay taxes and that this is an obligation of the government. Indeed, in most 
cases there is little or no love or even consideration for the aged and destitute 
father or mother. Today we see parents of advanced ages. totally disabled and 
on the threshold of death, being cared for in nursing homes and hospitals at 
public expense. The children of these parents are living very comfortably in 
homes of considerable worth, earning substantial salaries and money in the bank 
but are not contributing to the support of these parents. 
So stating, the court held the respondent, age sixty-one, liable for the support of his 
destitute mother. 
69. Lasher v. Decker, 43 Misc. 2d 211, 250 N.Y.S.2d 615 (Family Ct., Dutchess Co. 
 (child abandoned during minority is not required to support mother). 
 Alexander, Family Law, 1963 Survey of N.Y. Law, 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 369. 371 
(1963). 
71. Kehn v. Mainella, 40 Misc. 2d 55, 242 N.Y.S.2d 732 (Family Ct., Blair Co. 1963). 
72. Op. cit. supra note 70, at 371. 
73. 253 N.Y. I ,  170 N.E. 471 (1930). 
74. 21 App. Div. 2d 45, 248 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1st Dep't 1964). 
75. 20 App. Div. 2d 865,248 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1st Dep't 1964). 
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seminal fluid and had shown no sperm.7 6 Respondent declared himself 
ready to allow similar testing on behalf of petitioner but no such tests were 
requested. Nonetheless, the trial Judge held respondent to be the father. 
The appellate division affirmed. Speaking of the doctor's testimony the 
majority stated: 
Considering the rather unimpressive qualifications of the doctor as an expert 
in fertility, the fact that he first examined appellant almost six years after 
the child was conceived, and that the laboratory test of what purported to be 
appellant'S seminal fluid was also made six years after conception of the child, 
and in view of the absence of proof as to the circumstances under which the 
laboratory specimen was obtained . . . we believe that the trier of the facts 
was warranted in not adopting the opinion of appellant's expert as controlling 
in the case.77 
The dissent explains it this way: 
 court refused to credit the doctor's testimony on the ground that, while 
 was an active practitioner in the field of venereal disease, he was not doing 
research in fertility .... All that was offered in opposition was the possibility 
that the semen had not been analyzed under proper conditions . . . and the 
court's independent research that the number of cells in an individual's semen 
varies from time to time and the impregnable quality of the cells may vary with 
different partners to the act of copulation.78 
1£ the dissent is to be believed, it would appear that the appellate division 
held the physician to be an unimpressive expert in fertility whose testimony 
must bow to the court's expertise in fertility based on "independent re­
search." 
The defense of sterility is unusual in paternity proceedings but a 
demand for blood grouping is not. It is specifically recognized in the 
Family Court Act, 7 9  under appropriate circumstances, to exculpate putative 
fathers. This year, requests for blood tests raised a number of questions. 
In a divorce proceeding brought by H, "\,y requested a blood test of her 
child and her husband to demonstrate that someone other than her hus­
band had fathered the child. Apparently, she sought by this method to gain 
cw.tody of the child. The court denied the test on the theory that she 
could not, after a long period of marriage, thus bastardize her offspring, 
which she and H had treated as a child of the marriage for at least six 
years and which he still claimed to be his child.80 In light of the strong 
public policy favoring the legitimation of children, the court's conclusion 
seems appropriate. 
Even the paternity proceedings in which blood tests are relevant seem 
to cause some difficulty. "\Vhatever the merits of the use of blood tests to 
76. The majority found the test unconvincing since it was performed six years 
after the child was conceived. Since it was petitioner rather than respondent who 
presumably delayed the action for the intervening period, it is not clear why the lapse 
of time should militate against respondent's evidence. 
77. Supra note 75, at 866, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 612-13. 
78. Id. at 866·67, 248 N.Y.5.2d at 613. 
79. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 532. 
80. Hill v. Hill, 20 App. Div. 2d 923,249 N.Y.S.2d 751 (2d Dep't 1964). 
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provide evidence of possible paternity, S l the legislature specifically pro­
vided for their use "only in cases where definite exclusion is established."s2 
The legislature has also provided that the court shall order blood-grouping 
tests on demand of the respondent.8 3 This creates something of a dilemma. 
It is clear that were the question of paternity tried to a jury, which it is 
not,8 4 the results of nonexculpating tests could well be kept from the trier 
of fact, as is apparently contemplated. It is difficult, however, to see how 
the family court judge will fail to discover the results of the tests either 
way. Presumably, if the tests exculpate, the respondent will introduce them; 
if tests have been ordered and respondent does not come forward, what 
conclusion can be drawn but that the tests are not helpful to him? 
Realizing that the judge will likely discover the results anyway, should 
it make any difference if the report of the results of the tests are made 
directly to him? In addition, should it be determinative that the court, in 
apparent violation of the statutory rule, "made it [the blood-grouping test 
report] a part of the record"? The third department thought not.811 It may 
well be that all one can hope for is that the court not give such results 
evidentiary weight; the appellate division found that they had not been 
given weight in this case. Whatever ideal was expressed in the qualified­
admissibility theory seems to be rather impracticable in the context of a 
paternity trial. 
It is easy to understand why courts are still solicitous of the status of 
the child. Aside from the social stigma of bastardy, the legal attributes 
of illegitimacy are still rather frightening. Within the year another court 
decided that the illegitimate'S estate was not entitled to participate in the 
distribution of the estate of a legitimate child of the same mother. S6 The 
result is governed by a statute. 8 7  Since a legitimate child of the mother was 
alive, the illegitimate child would not inherit even from his sole potential 
source of intestate distribution: his mother. Even where the statute is less 
clearly controlling, however, New York courts have been chary of allowing 
inheritance by illegitimates.ss In one respect, however, illegitimates fare 
better today than in the past. The Family Court Act provides for their sup­
port by the father for twenty-one years,8 9  as opposed to the previous mini­
mum-of-sixteen years standard, and, apparently, the act will be retroactively 
applied.90 
81. See 7 Syracuse L. Rev. 162 (1955). 
82. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 532. 
83. Ibid. 
84. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 531. 
85. People v. Kelly, 20 App. Div. 2d 740, 246 N.Y.S.2d 877, 878 (3d Dep't 1964). 
86. Matter of Estate of Stanco, 41 Misc. 2d 419, 245 N.Y.s.2d 69 (SUIT. Ct .• Nas.�au Co. 
1963). 
87. N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 83(13). 
88. Matter of Estate of  281 N.Y. 688, 23 N.E.2d 18 (1939). 
89. N.Y. Family Ct. Act §  
90. Anonymous v. Anonymous. 40 Misc. 2d 492, 243 N.y.s.2d 630 (Family Ct .• N.Y.C. 
1963). 
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Contraception and Abortion.-Although discussion of the population 
explosion and means of family planning abound, the law appears to take 
little cognizance of the problem. An archaic statute, which is apparently 
unenforced,lIl seems to bar the use of contraceptives in this state except 
under the direction of a physician for the prevention of disease (which 
pregnancy presumably is not).9 2 Also, in New York as in other states, strong 
penal sanctions exist for abortion.9 3 The vigor with which the abortion 
provisions may be enforced is well demonstrated this year by People v. 
Lovell,1I1, in which the defendant was charged with the felony of abortion 
on the ground that she had told the abortee where to find an abortionist.9 s 
Misconduct of Children.-The question where to place a person "in 
need of supervision " under the Family Court Act,U6 which was troublesome 
last year, 9 7 was temporarily resolved this year. After Anonymous v. Peoplell8 
determined that a child could be placed in a departmental social welfare 
training school under these provisions,1I 9 the legislature amended Section 
756 of the Family Court Act to provide for such placement for a tem­
porary period to end July 1, 1965. In the interim, one family court judge, 
in Matter of Anonymous,lOO felt obliged to release a girl to the custody of 
her parents "with concern and reluctance, " being unable otherwise to solve 
the dilemma. 
Procedural safeguards were apparently also coming to the fore. Depart­
ing from its more charitable position of the year before,lOl the appellate 
division this year, in a rather strong opinion, denounced the mishandling 
of Matter of Dennis, by the family courtl02 and concluded, "we are not 
unmindful that we are dealing with an Act which is of very recent origin 
and that Family Court Judges in all good conscience may find the transition 
91. But see Barretta v. Barretta, 182 Misc. 852, 46 N.Y.S.2d 261 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 
1944) (insistence on use of contraceptives is moral, turpitude barring a separation decree 
because of statute). 
92. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 1142-45. 
911. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 80-82. 
94. 40 Misc. 2d 458, 242 N.Y.S.2d 958 (Oneida County Ct. 1963). 
95. While not called on to rule on this question directly, the court expressed some 
skepticism as to the soundness of the theory. Since the abortee herself is not guilty of a 
section 80 violation, People v. Vedder, 98 N.Y. 630 (1885), defendant could not be a 
principal to that crime, nor, opines the court, does disclosing the location of an abortionist 
constitute advising abortion within the meaning of section 80(1), at least where it is not 
demonstrated that an act of abortion even took place. It thus appears that the defendant 
may escape a felony conviction unless she can be demonstrated to be more materially 
implicated in the attempted act_ 
96. N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 712. 
97. Alexander, Family Law, 19611 Survey of N.Y. Law, 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 369, 377 
(19611). 
98. 20 App. Div. 2d 1195, 247 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1st Dep't 1964). 
99. Reversing a contrary determination in Matter of Anonymous, 40 Misc. 2d 8, 242 
N.Y.S.2d 571 (Family Ct., Bronx Co. 1963). 
100. 411 Misc. 2d 2111, 215, 250 N.Y.S.2d 395, 1197 (Family Ct., Bronx Co. 1964). 
101. See Alexander, Family Law, 19611 Survey of N.Y. Law, 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 369, 
1179  
 20 App. Div. 2d 86, 244 N.Y.S.2d 798 (4th Dep't 1964). 
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from the procedures of the Children's Court to be difficult. Nevertheless, 
all of us who are charged with the responsibility of dealing with proceed­
ings under the Family Court Act must constantly be vigilant to observe and 
follow its provisions."lo3 Acting vigilantly, it also reversed Matter of 
Smith104 for failure to hold a dispositional hearing and ordered that a hear­
ing be held whether or not the family court thought it knew enough about 
the respondent to dispense with the hearing. 
Custody Proceedings.-One of the significant problems in child cus­
tody cases, where parents have contact with courts of more than one 
jurisdiction, is the fact that courts are not bound by prior decrees of sister 
states. This means that the issue of custody is relitigable and the results 
may be unsettling. They may also be absurd. Mr. Sloane had obtained a 
divorce from Mrs. Sloane in Massachusetts, but Mrs. Sloane was given the 
custody of the child subject to rights of visitation of the father. The ar­
rangement worked poorly; in order to get his visitation rights, the father 
once had to apply for habeas corpus in a New York court. The order which 
.. 
issued granted him his rights to custody, qualified by a direction to rcturn 
the child to the mother at the end of the period allowed by the Massachu­
setts decree. Mr. Sloane thereupon sought and obtained a modification of 
the Massachusetts decree from the Massachusetts court. The modified decree 
made him the custodian of his child. He thereupon applied for a modifica­
tion of the New York judgment which would, by its express terms, have re­
quired him to relinquish the custody of his child (as under the unmodified 
Massachusetts decree) to his wife. Special term denied his application. Fortu­
nately, the appellate division, in Sloane v. Sloane,105 corrected the error. Al­
though it lectured the trial court about its confusion of a proceeding prem­
ised on compliance with the existing Massachusetts decree and a hearing on 
the merits of child custody, the appellate court also pointed out that had 
there been a plenary hearing, special term would have been justified in ignor­
ing the Massachusetts modification as an insufficient intervening change in 
circumstances to warrant modifying a New York order. To add to the prob­
lems of a child of a broken home, the problem of conflicting custody decrees 
in adjoining states seems unfortunate. 
It may have been unduly optimistic to hope that "Judge VanVoorhis' 
lucid opinion [in Kesseler v. Kesseler]106 should go far in resolving any rc­
maining doubt concerning independent judicial inquiry in custody cases."107 
A Kings County justice seems to have gone farther this year than even the 
prior decisions presumably rejected in Kesseler. In Chitti v. Fitzgerald,108 
103. Id. at 89-90, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 801. 
104. 21 App. Div_ 2d 737, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (4th Dep't 1964). 
105. 20 App. Div. 2d 862, 248 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1st Dep't 1964). 
106. 10 N.Y.2d 445,180 N.E.2d 402, 225 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962). 
107. Alexander, Family Law, 1962 Survey of N.Y. Law, 14 Syracuse L. Rev. 333, 342 
(1962). 
108. 40 Misc. 2d 966, 244 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1963). 
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a wife sought to alter her husband's rights to visitation. Frustrated in his 
attempt to inform himself of the husband's mental condition, the trial 
justice, over the husband's objection, examined the husband's hospital 
records. On the basis of his perusal of these records, he removed the hus­
band's right to visitation until the husband would submit to a psychiatric 
examination. The result may be defensible. A trial court should probably 
be given a great deal of discretion in altering custodial decrees. On the 
other hand, an assertion that the court has "inherent power to do what is 
best to protect the welfare of the infant" 109 and the conclusion that this re­
quires admitting othenvise inadmissible evidence, which in this case is also 
specifically protected by statute,1 1o seems unsupportable in light of Kesseler. 
In the third department, Kesseler fared better. In Johnson v. John­
son,l 1 1  the appellate division reversed a trial court determination which 
was based in part on the report of a probation officer. The report was the 
product of an investigation ordered at "the direction of the Court." There 
was no consent or stipulation. Furthermore, the probation officer, called as 
a witness at the trial by the father, testified to information she had gleaned, 
but refused to identify a "neighbor" with whom she testified she had had 
several conversations about respondent-mother. The court admitted the 
te�timony over objection and also refused to order the probation officer to 
name her informant. The case thus put in issue not only the question of 
the use by the court of an unstipulated probation report, but also the 
meaning of the reservation in Kesseler preserving the right of a court to 
order an investigation with the resultant testimony to be available to the 
parties "to deal with under common-law rules in the absence of their 
consent" and also "to furnish leads for the introduction of common-law 
evidence." 1l2 Holding that the trial court had committed error by admitting 
the testimony, the appellate division added that the "to furnish leads" 
language of Kesseler "is limited to the use of the report as a basis for 
questions put to the witnesses during the course of the hearing" and, 
generally, that probation "reports may properly provide avenues of inquiry 
but may not form in any degree a basis for the court's decision in the ab­
sence of stipulation or consent. The oral testimony of the investigating 
officer may, of course, be received but in that case it is subject to all common­
law rules of evidence." 1 1 3 
Psychiatric testimony, which poses many of the same problems in 
custody cases, also was again in issue. One court not only ordered a psychiat­
ric report to help it (apparently without stipulation by the parties) but, 
109. Id. at 967, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 442. 
110. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 4504. 
I l l . 21 App. Div. 2d 256, 258, 250 N.Y.S.2d 137, 138 (3d Dep't 1964). 
112. Supra note 106, at 452, 180 N.E.2d at 405, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 5-6. 
1 1 3. Supra note l l l ,  at 260, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 141.  
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having received the report, decided the custody question without giving the 
parents a post-report hearing. The appellate division reversed.1H 
The problem of determining custody in the best interest of the child 
is, of course, staggering. One can understand the motivation of courts in 
accepting professional guidance uncritically. The matters in question seem, 
at first blush, to be rather removed from the types of issues which the courts 
are experienced at handling. As one court illustrated this year, however,11I1 
deference to psychiatric expertise may, in some instances, be an abdication 
of traditional judicial expertise in fact finding. Ruling on an application 
to certify a child to the Meadowbrook Hospital, made by the superintendent 
of that hospital, a court was faced with review of a diagnosis of schizo­
phrenic reaction to childhood coupled with a recommendation of certifica­
tion. Without contradicting medical testimony it, nonetheless, refused to 
certify the child. According to the court, the diagnosis turned primarily on 
the implications of the child's prior acts of fire setting. These, in turn, since 
they were not observed by the examining physicians, depended on assertions 
by the child's adoptive parents. Suspecting the reliability of the assertions, 
the court refused to accept the conclusion based on them. 
The case illustrates again a unique quality of psychiatric diagnosis. 
Unlike instances of bacteriological infection for which independent em­
pirical testing is feasible, the accuracy of a diagnosis may depend signifi­
cantly on the physician's ability to determine the truth of assertions made 
concerning the patient's prior conduct; this fact finding process would 
seem singularly reviewable by courts accustomed, also, to making such 
determinations.11 6 
114. Knapp v. Knapp, 21 App. Div. 2d 761, 250 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1st Dep't 1964). 
115. Matter of Anonymous, 42 Misc. 2d 572, 248 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Nassau County Ct. 
1964). 
116. See generally, Szasz, Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry (1963); Leifer, The Competence 
of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of Incompetency: A Sceptical Inquiry 
into the Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists, I4  Syracuse L. Rev. 564 (1963). 
